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I study the implications of economic shocks for objective and subjective CEO
performance evaluation. A shock perturbs pay-setting parties’ information about the
firm and the CEO. I argue that pay-setting parties then lack information they need
for evaluating the CEO objectively, and de-emphasize objective CEO performance
evaluation in favour of subjective CEO performance evaluation; over time, pay-setting
parties become better informed about the firm as well as the CEO, and increasingly
use again objective CEO performance evaluation. My evidence, which uses data on
objective and subjective CEO performance evaluation in U.S. executive pay between
1992 and 2013, is consistent with my argument.
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1 Introduction
Recent history has witnessed a series of economic shocks, including the 1999–2001 burst of
the internet bubble and the 2007–2009 subprime mortgage crisis.1 I study how shocks shape
objective and subjective CEO performance evaluation. I explore objective CEO performance
evaluation using the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings. Shocks can affect this sensitivity
through three channels. First, shocks can shift a firm’s investment opportunities, which
shape the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings (Smith & Watts, 1992). Second, shocks
can represent factors outside of a CEO’s control and, as such, have implications for the
pay–performance sensitivity (Albuquerque, 2009; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
My interest lies in a third, unexplored channel: shocks can disturb pay-setting parties’
information about earnings, specifically their information about how earnings are determined
by CEO ability and factors outside of CEO control (henceforth: noise). Pay-setting parties
set the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings in light of their information about these two
parameters; however, their information is perturbed when a shock occurs, and pay-setting
parties need to estimate post-shock CEO ability and post-shock noise. This estimation
process gives rise to estimation risk; that is, the estimated values of post-shock CEO ability
and noise have higher variability than their full information counterparts. To mitigate the
impact of estimation risk on a risk-averse CEO, pay-setting parties lower the sensitivity of
CEO cash pay to earnings after a shock. Over time, pay-setting parties learn about post-
shock CEO ability and noise, and estimate these more precisely. Estimation risk declines,
and the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings can be raised. My first hypothesis predicts
that the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings increases as time passes after a shock occurs.
To identify shocks, I rely on extreme market-adjusted stock returns: a firm experiences
a shock when its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive or
to the decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns across all sample observations. Of
1I follow Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and define shocks as unexpected structural modifications in a
firm’s economic environment.
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my sample of 2,737 U.S. firms, 1,948 (71.2%) experienced at least one shock between 1950
and 2012. Using executive pay data from EXECUCOMP between 1992 and 2013, I find a
significantly positive association between the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to a firm’s post-
shock earnings, and the number of years gone by since the firm experienced its last shock.
Immediately after a shock, the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings is such that a 10%
increase in earnings results in a 3.4% raise in CEO cash pay. As the number of years since
the shock rises to its median (i.e., 5), the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings increases
by about 20%: the pay–performance sensitivity is such that a 10% increase in earnings leads
to a 4.0% raise in CEO cash pay.
I consider alternative explanations for my findings. After a shock, firms may change
their pay–performance sensitivity because the shock modifies their investment opportunity
set or because the shock represents noise. To address this concern, I control for a firm’s
growth options and noise (Lambert & Larcker, 1987; Smith & Watts, 1992) as well as for
earnings persistence and CEO tenure (Baber, Kang, & Kumar, 1998; Sloan, 1993). Next, my
analysis assumes that shocks are exogenous. It is possible, however, that firms experiencing
fewer shocks have distinct investment, financing, and governance policies that set them apart
from firms experiencing more shocks; these distinct policies may account not only for the
shocks but also for the post-shock pay–performance sensitivity. I address this possibility
in two ways. First, I explore exogenous shocks, which I proxy for by using U.S. macro-
economic shocks (i.e., recessions and expansions) between 1990 and 2009. My results show
that firms increase the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings as time passes since a macro-
economic shock occurred. Second, I control for a firm’s resilience to shocks. Firms may
build up resilience to shocks because of their investment, financing, and governance policies.
I measure resilience using the slope coefficient from a regression of a firm’s earnings on its
market-adjusted returns. My findings remain unchanged; they also show that resilience is
positively associated with the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings.
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The reduced post-shock association between CEO cash pay and earnings raises the
question of how firms set CEO cash pay right after a shock. The literature indicates that CEO
cash pay is often determined subjectively (Bushman & Indjejikian, 1993; Moers, 2002). Pay-
setting parties rely on subjective CEO performance evaluation when objective performance
measures such as earnings are problematic (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Bushman,
Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004). After a shock,
earnings are problematic for setting pay since pay-setting parties lack information about post-
shock earnings. The pay-setting process can be improved when pay-setting parties wait until
year-end to set CEO cash pay subjectively ex post. Doing so provides them with additional
time to gather information about the post-shock environment. I predict that firms draw more
intensively on subjective performance evaluation right after a shock. To test this hypothesis,
I hand-collect data on subjective performance evaluation from corporate proxy filings for a
subsample of 353 firms.
Univariate tests show that, right after a shock, firms rely to a larger extent on subjective
performance evaluation. In particular, the number of firms that use subjective performance
evaluation increases by 5.5% after a shock. Also, firms use a larger number of performance
measures in their subjective performance evaluation. Firms rely, on average, on 2.16 subjective
performance measures after a shock, compared to 1.85 in the shock year. My univariate
results are significant after comparison with control firms that do not experience shocks and
that are matched to shock firms by size and industry. Because my matching procedure may
fail to successfully account for variables shown by the literature to determine subjective
performance evaluation (i.e., growth options, risk, size, losses, and CEO tenure), I use a
multivariate approach to control for these variables (Bushman et al., 1996; Gibbs et al.,
2004; Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Raith, 2008; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009); my univariate
results hold. This evidence suggests that, right after a shock, firms increasingly rely on
subjective performance evaluation for setting CEO cash pay.
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Overall, my study broadens our understanding of how economic shocks shape CEO
performance evaluation. I highlight that shocks can perturb the information that pay-
setting parties need for evaluating the CEO. My results suggest that right after a shock,
when pay-setting parties have little information about the post-shock environment, firms
rely less on objective CEO performance evaluation, as indicated by a weaker post-shock
pay–performance sensitivity, and instead use subjective CEO performance evaluation to a
larger extent. In other words, firms substitute objective CEO performance evaluation with
subjective CEO performance evaluation. As time passes after a shock and pay-setting parties
accumulate information about the post-shock environment, firms increasingly rely again on
objective CEO performance evaluation. While the literature on CEO performance evaluation
is rich and has provided us with many useful insights (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder,
2007; Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala, & Senbet, 2010), it has not explored the role of
shocks in disturbing the information that pay-setting parties require. My study steps into
this void by analyzing the implications of this disturbance for CEO performance evaluation.
This analysis is instructive as it shows that CEO performance evaluation is not static in
an environment characterized by shocks, but shifts between subjective and objective CEO
performance evaluation with the time that passes since a shock occurred.
My study also contributes to our understanding of subjective CEO performance evaluation,
by focusing on the specific context of shocks. This context is informative, as it is characterized
by heightened uncertainty. Researchers have theorized that subjective performance evaluation
is beneficial in situations of increased uncertainty (Baker et al., 1994; Bushman et al., 1996;
Gibbs et al., 2004). Yet, no study has provided empirical support for this prediction. My
study is the first to document that subjective CEO performance evaluation is associated
with uncertainty, and used more intensely right after shocks when uncertainty is higher.
This result suggests that in an environment characterized by heightened uncertainty, firms
substitute objective CEO performance evaluation with subjective CEO performance evaluation.
This evidence speaks to the question, raised by Van der Stede (2011), of whether firms are
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‘more prone to use subjectivity to correct for uncontrollable factors due to volatile business
conditions’ (p. 616). My study answers affirmatively.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable predictions of
how shocks affect earnings-based CEO cash pay. Section 3 details the sample selection and
describes shocks. Section 4 outlines the empirical analysis, discusses the results regarding
the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings, and provides further tests. Section 5 discusses
the evidence regarding subjective performance evaluation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypothesis Development
To characterize CEO cash pay in the presence of shocks, I use the standard principal–agent
framework (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). CEO cash pay W depends on earnings y: W =
α+ βy, where α is salary and β the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings y (the focus of
my analysis). I draw on Gibbons and Murphy (1992) to conceptualize earnings as a function
of three parameters: y = e + a + η, where e is CEO effort; a is CEO ability; and η is noise
(e.g., a rival’s output decisions), which is normally distributed with a mean θ and a variance
σ2. What differentiates the three parameters e, a, and η is the information that pay-setting
parties (i.e., the compensation committee and the CEO) have about each one of them.
Pay-setting parties know CEO effort e. This knowledge arises from the way CEO cash
pay is determined: the compensation committee selects CEO effort so as to maximize the
firm’s profits, and sets the sensitivity β of CEO cash pay to earnings to ensure that the CEO
has no incentives other than to choose this effort. Although the compensation committee
knows CEO effort, it can never verify this knowledge, since CEO effort is not observable
(Lambert, 2001).
In contrast, pay-setting parties do not know CEO ability a and noise η. This depiction
deviates from the literature, which generally assumes that pay-setting parties know a and
5
η. The latter assumption is justified when the firm’s environment is stable and when pay-
setting parties’ information about CEO ability or noise is not disturbed. Shocks, however,
perturb this information. Consider a negative shock, such as a new rival that enters the
firm’s product market. Pay-setting parties do not know how able the CEO will be in coping
with harsher competition, nor how important noise (e.g., the rival’s output decisions) will
be in shaping the firm’s post-shock earnings. Now take a positive shock, such as an increase
in product market demand. Again, pay-setting parties do not know the CEO’s ability in
dealing with the heightened demand, nor do they know the importance of noise (e.g., rivals’
responses to the increased demand) in the firm’s post-shock earnings.
Pay-setting parties’ lack of information about post-shock CEO ability and noise is salient
as it has repercussions for CEO cash pay. After the shock, pay-setting parties need to
estimate CEO ability and noise, since both parameters are required for setting the optimal
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings. The estimation process gives rise to estimation
risk: estimated post-shock CEO ability and noise have higher variability than their full
information counterparts. This added variability reflects pay-setting parties’ uncertainty
about the post-shock true values of CEO ability and noise.
Since a risk-averse CEO dislikes such variability, pay-setting parties reduce the sensitivity
of CEO cash pay to earnings after the shock, when estimation risk is highest. Over time,
as they gather information and learn about post-shock CEO ability and noise, they can
more precisely estimate these two parameters. Estimation risk declines and the optimal
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings can be increased; that is, the sensitivity of CEO
cash pay to earnings is negatively associated with estimation risk. This negative association
is formally derived in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) for estimation risk that results from
uncertainty about CEO ability; the Online Supplement provides the proof for estimation
risk that ensues from uncertainty about noise. Empirically, I measure estimation risk as the
time gone by since a shock occurred: estimation risk is lower when more years have elapsed
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since the shock. My first testable prediction is as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings rises with the
number of years since the last shock occurred.
The above discussion presumes that CEO cash pay is set ex ante for the year ahead.
The compensation committee often adjusts CEO cash pay ex post, and uses subjective
performance evaluation to appraise the CEO based on realized non-financial and financial
performance (Bushman et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 2004; Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003; Moers,
2002). The compensation committee is likely to use subjective performance evaluation more
intensely right after a shock, because it lacks information about post-shock CEO ability
and noise. Relying on subjective performance evaluation provides it with time to gather
additional information, as it can wait until the year is over to subjectively adjust CEO cash
pay based on information obtained during the year.
Such a use of subjective performance evaluation is consistent with research showing
that subjective performance evaluation can mitigate problems with objective performance
measures (Baker et al., 1994). Research has found that subjective performance evaluation
is used more intensely when objective performance measures fail to capture all aspects of
CEO effort (Gibbs et al., 2004). Also, scholars have predicted that firms use subjective
performance evaluation more intensely when uncertainty is higher. Yet empirical research
to date has failed to support this prediction. Gibbs et al. (2004) and Bushman et al. (1996)
empirically examine the association between risk in performance measures and subjective
performance evaluation, but do not find evidence of an association.
While subjective performance evaluation may be attractive after a shock, it is costly.
The compensation committee may bias its performance evaluation or compress its ratings;
the CEO can engage in influence activities (Gibbs et al., 2004; Moers, 2002; Prendergast
& Topel, 1993). Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the benefits from using
subjective performance evaluation after a shock offset any associated costs. If so, I expect
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that firms use subjective performance evaluation more intensely. My second hypothesis
follows.
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, firms that experience a shock use subjective performance
evaluation more intensely for setting CEO cash pay in the subsequent year.
3 Sample and Shocks
Sample selection is detailed in Table 1. CEO compensation data are from EXECUCOMP,
accounting data from COMPUSTAT, and stock price data from CRSP. Instances where the
CEO is in office for less than a fiscal year and where the CEO serves at more than one firm
are excluded. Observations without earnings data from COMPUSTAT or return data from
CRSP, as well as observations with fiscal year end changes, are discarded. The final sample
has 2,737 firms (25,383 firm-years) between 1992 and 2013.
–INSERT TABLE 1 HERE–
A firm-specific shock occurs when a firm’s annual market-adjusted return belongs to
the decile of the most positive market-adjusted returns or the decile of the most negative
market-adjusted returns, across all years between 1950 and 2012, for all sample firms.2 Table
2 shows the number, and percentage, of sample firms that experience no or at least one firm-
specific shock since 1950. Of the 2, 737 sample firms, 789 (28.8%) do not experience a shock,
while 1,948 (71.2%) experience at least one shock. 587 firms (21.5%) have exactly one shock,
431 (15.8%) two shocks, 301 (11.0%) three shocks, 250 (9.1%) four shocks, 137 (5.0%) five
shocks, and 242 (8.8%) more than five shocks. The maximum number of shocks per firm is
14, experienced by two firms.
2I choose 1950 as the starting year to ensure that I correctly count the number of years since the last
shock occurred for firms that experience a shock before the sample period starts in 1992. I choose 2012 as the
ending year because the test of Hypothesis 1 involves counting the number of years since a shock occurred;
in the last year of my sample, 2013, I then have at least one observation for firms that experience a shock in
2012.
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–INSERT TABLE 2 HERE–
I capture the time elapsed since the last shock using the variable NumberFSi,t , which
counts the number of years, for each firm i, since the last firm-specific shock, up until and
including year t. Table 3 shows that the average [median] number of years since the last
shock is 7.55 [5].
–INSERT TABLE 3 HERE–
4 Tests of Hypothesis 1
4.1 Regression Model
I use the following regression model to test Hypothesis 1.
CEOCashPayi,t = βEarningsi,t + γEarningsi,tNumber
FS
i,t
+δNumberFSi,t + ΛEarningsi,tControls+ ΘK + εi,t, (1)
where CEOCashPayi,t is the natural logarithm of cash pay (i.e., salary and bonus) the
CEO of firm i earns in fiscal year t. The natural logarithm controls for skewness in pay data.
Table 3 shows that average CEO cash pay (bonus pay) is $837, 028 ($359, 625). Earningsi,t
is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, scaled by prior-year total
assets. Average (median) earnings are 4.4% (5.2%). All variables are detailed in Appendix
B. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings increases with
the number of years since the last shock, implying that the coefficient γ is positive.
I make no prediction for the coefficient δ, which captures the association between CEO
cash pay and NumberFSi,t . As more years elapse after a shock and the pay–performance
sensitivity increases, expected CEO incentive pay is higher; for a given reservation wage,
the CEO requires lower salary. Moreover, NumberFSi,t affects CEO cash pay via the CEO’s
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risk premium, in two opposing ways. First, a higher NumberFSi,t reflects lower estimation
risk, which decreases the CEO’s risk premium, and salary falls. Second, the sensitivity of
CEO cash pay to earnings rises with NumberFSi,t , which increases the CEO’s risk premium,
and salary rises. The overall impact of NumberFSi,t on salary and CEO cash pay depends on
which one of the latter three effects dominates.
The matrix Controls includes variables that have been shown in the literature to be
associated with the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings: CEO tenure, the book-to-
market ratio, risk from earnings noise, and earnings persistence (Baber et al., 1998; Gibbons
& Murphy, 1992; Lambert & Larcker, 1987; Smith & Watts, 1992). Untabulated results show
that NumberFSi,t is significantly negatively correlated with the book-to-market ratio, and
significantly positively correlated with CEO tenure, risk from earnings noise, and earnings
persistence.
The coefficient β captures the pay–performance sensitivity to earnings when NumberFSi,t
and the variables in Controls are not included in regression (1), or when they do not affect
the association between CEO cash pay and earnings. In this case, β is expected to be
positive. However, research suggests that the variables in Controls influence the association
between CEO cash pay and earnings. To then interpret this association, the coefficient β
needs to be considered in conjunction with the coefficients in Λ. Furthermore, if NumberFSi,t
affects, as hypothesized, the association between CEO cash pay and earnings, the coefficient
γ has to be taken into account as well.
Control variables for the level of CEO cash pay are in K. CEO cash pay is associated with
firm characteristics (i.e, size, growth options, firm risk, stock returns) and CEO characteristics
(i.e., CEO tenure, the presence of a CEO-chairman, the presence of an interlocked CEO)
(Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Deckop, 1988; Murphy,
1999, 2000; Smith & Watts, 1992). Regression (1) includes CEO and year fixed effects
to control for unobservable factors that vary across CEOs and time, and influence CEO
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pay (e.g., education, training, and responsibilities of the CEO). Regression (1) is estimated
in the pooled cross-section via OLS, with standard errors clustered by firm and robust to
heteroscedasticity.
4.2 Results
The results from estimating regression (1) are displayed in Table 4. They support Hypothesis
1: the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings rises with the number of years since the last
shock. In column (3), the coefficient on earnings interacted with NumberFSi,t is significantly
positive at 0.016 (t-statistic: 2.30).3 Economically, the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to
earnings rises by about 20% when the number of years since the last shock increases from 1
to its median of 5.4
–INSERT TABLE 4 HERE–
Column (3) controls for other determinants of the pay–performance sensitivity to earnings.
Comparing column (3) to column (1) reveals that including these determinants does not
substantially alter how NumberFSi,t is associated with the pay–performance sensitivity. I find
that, consistent with prior research, these determinants shape the sensitivity of CEO cash
pay to earnings, which is higher when a firm has more growth options, less risk from earnings
noise, and more persistent earnings. CEO tenure fails to be consistently associated with the
pay–performance sensitivity.
3The analysis includes only observations from sample firms that experience at least one shock between
1950 and 2012. Also, it excludes 247 observations whose studentized residuals have an absolute value larger
than 2. Such observations are problematic since they do not conform to the estimated model (Greene, 2012).
4Right after a firm-specific shock (i.e., NumberFSi,t = 1), the pay–performance sensitivity to earnings
is 0.332 ∼= 0.132 + 0.016 × 1 + 0.184, where 0.184 is the sum of the coefficients on Earningsi,t interacted
with controls: 0.184 ∼= (0.106)(1.84) + (−0.171)(0.75) + (−0.415)(0.51) + (0.279)(0.71), where 1.84, 0.75,
0.51, 0.71 are the average values for CEOTenurei,t, BooktoMarketi,t−1, Riski,t−1 and Persistencei. This
implies that a 10% point increase in earnings yields a 3.37% = exp[0.332 × 0.1] − 1 rise in CEO cash
pay, or $28, 221, when applied to average CEO cash pay of $837, 028. When the number of years since
the last firm-specific shock rises to the median (i.e., NumberFSi,t = 5), the pay–performance sensitivity to
earnings is 0.396 ∼= 0.132 + 0.016 × 5 + 0.184. This implies that a 10% point rise in earnings gives a
4.04% = exp[0.396 × 0.1] − 1 increase in CEO cash pay, or $33, 776. The sensitivity of CEO cash pay to
earnings thus increases by 19.9% = 4.04%−3.37%3.37% as the number of years since the firm-specific shock rises
from 1 to the median.
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Finally, column (3) shows that the coefficient on NumberFSi,t is negative at −0.003 (t-
statistic: −2.25), which suggests that CEOs require less cash pay as shocks recede into the
past.
4.3 Further Tests
Underlying my analysis is the assumption that shocks are exogenous. This assumption
is violated when shocks are influenced by a firm’s investment, financing, and governance
policies. I address this concern in two ways, as discussed below.
4.3.1 Macro-Economic Shocks
The assumption of exogeneity likely holds for macro-economic shocks. I identify such shocks
using the latest business cycle data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
which defines, in the vicinity of my sample period, three recession periods (i.e., July 1990
through March 1991, March 2001 through November 2001, and December 2007 through
June 2009) and three expansion periods (i.e., March 1991 through March 2001, November
2001 through December 2007, and from June 2009 onwards). I define the first year in each
recession and expansion period as the year of the macro-economic shock. For the three
recession periods, the years of macro-economic shocks are 1990, 2001, and 2007; for the
three expansion periods, the years of macro-economic shocks are 1991, 2001, and 2009.
I define the variable NumberMACROi,t as the number of years since the last macro-economic
shock occurred, up until and including year t, starting in 1990 (i.e., the year of the first macro-
economic shock in the vicinity of the sample period). As shown in Table 3, the average
[median] number of years since the last macro-economic shock is 3.15 [3]. The results for
testing Hypothesis 1 for macro-economic shocks, in column (1) of Table 5, show that the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings rises with the number of years since the last macro-
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economic shock, consistent with the evidence for firm-specific shocks.5 The coefficient on
earnings interacted with NumberMACROi,t is significantly positive at 0.052 (t-statistic: 5.58).
Economically, the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings increases by 33% as the number
of years since the last macro-economic shock rises from 1 to the median of 3.6 This evidence
is consistent with the findings from firm-specific shocks, which mitigates the concern that
the latter results may obtain because of the potentially endogenous nature of firm-specific
shocks.
–INSERT TABLE 5 HERE–
4.3.2 Resilience to Shocks
Firms with different investment, financing, and governance policies may have developed a
distinct resilience to shocks. I address this possibility by constructing two empirical measures
of resilience, one that captures resilience to firm-specific shocks and a second one that proxies
for resilience to macro-economic shocks. To measure resilience to firm-specific shocks, I
estimate, for each firm-year, a regression of earnings (the main performance measure) on
market-adjusted returns (the basis for the measure of firm-specific shocks) during the 5 years
preceding the sample year. I obtain the slope coefficient on market-adjusted returns, take
its absolute value, and multiply it by −1. I call the resulting variable ResilienceFSi,t−1: larger
values of ResilienceFSi,t−1 indicate that earnings are less associated with market-adjusted
returns, and proxy for firm-years more resilient to shocks. To measure macro-economic
shocks, I use a similar methodology. I estimate, for each firm-year, a regression of earnings on
5I exclude 386 observations whose studentized residuals have an absolute value larger than 2. See footnote
3.
6Right after a macro-economic shock (i.e., NumberMACROi,t = 1), the pay–performance sensitivity to
earnings is 0.321 ∼= 0.181 + 0.052 × 1 + 0.088, where 0.088 is the sum of the undisplayed coefficients on
Earningsi,t interacted with controls. This implies that a 10% point increase in earnings yields a 3.26% =
exp[0.321× 0.1]− 1 rise in CEO cash pay, or $27, 282, when applied to average CEO cash pay of $837, 028.
When the number of years since the last macro-economic shock rises to the median (i.e., NumberMACROi,t =
3), the pay–performance sensitivity to earnings is 0.425 ∼= 0.181 + 0.054 × 3 + 0.088. This implies that a
10% point rise in earnings yields a 4.34% = exp[0.425× 0.1]− 1 increase in CEO cash pay, or $36, 317. The
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings thus increases by 33% = 4.34%−3.26%3.26% as the number of years since
the macro-economic shock rises from 1 to the median of 3.
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market returns (from the equally weighted CRSP market index) during the 5 years preceding
the sample year. I obtain the slope coefficient on market returns, take its absolute value,
multiply it by −1, and call this variable ResilienceMACROi,t−1 . I assume that equally weighted
market returns correlate with macro-economic shocks reported by the NBER.
I add my firm-specific and macro-economic resilience measures, as determinants of the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings, to the regressions for firm-specific and macro-
economic shocks. Table 5 shows that my earlier findings hold, for both types of shocks: the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings rises with the number of years since the last shock, as
shown in column (2) for macro-economic shocks and in column (4) for firm-specific shocks.
The coefficient on NumberMACROi,t interacted with Earningsi,t is significantly positive, at
0.053 (t-statistic: 5.69); the coefficient yielded by NumberFSi,t interacted with Earningsi,t
is significantly positive, at 0.019 (t-statistic: 2.56). Comparing columns (2) and (4) to
columns (1) and (3), which do not include resilience, indicates that adding resilience as a
determinant of the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings does not substantially modify
the results. Resilience itself matters for firm-specific but not for macro-economic shocks.
The coefficient on ResilienceFSi,t−1 interacted with earnings is significantly positive at 0.016
(t-statistic: 1.93), suggesting that firms more resilient to firm-specific shocks have a higher
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings. For macro-economic shocks, the coefficient on the
interaction of ResilienceMACROi,t−1 and earnings is positive but not statistically significant.
4.3.3 Other Tests
I perform five additional sensitivity tests, which are discussed and tabulated in the Online
Supplement. In these tests, I document that the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings
falls in the first year after a shock, and that my results hold for CEO bonus pay as well as
for total CEO pay. I also find that the results are stronger for negative than for positive
firm-specific shocks. Finally, I show that the evidence is not driven by changes in CEO risk
tolerance after a shock.
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5 Tests of Hypothesis 2
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which predicts that firms experiencing shocks use subjective
performance evaluation more intensely for setting CEO cash pay in the subsequent year.
Firms disclose information about subjective performance evaluation in their proxy statements.
Since this information is not available in databases, it is retrieved directly from proxy
statements. This process involves reading the section of the proxy statement that details
how CEO cash pay is set. Due to the hand-collected nature of this data gathering process, I
restrict the analysis of Hypothesis 2 to a subsample of the firms used for testing Hypothesis
1, as described next.
5.1 Subsample
My subsample comprises treatment and control firms. A treatment firm is a sample firm
that experiences a shock in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the
decile of the most positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the most negative
market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), has information on CEO cash pay
available in its proxy statements, and can be matched to a control firm. A control firm is
a sample firm that experiences no shock in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return
belongs to the decile of the least positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the
least negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), and has information
on CEO cash pay available in its proxy statements. To choose the criteria that allow me to
match treatment firms with control firms, I turn to studies on the determinants of subjective
performance evaluation.
First, I match according to firm size (i.e., the t−2 market value of common equity). Firm
size is associated with subjective performance evaluation (Bushman et al., 1996; Indjejikian
& Nanda, 2002). Second, I match according to fiscal year and 2-digit SIC code to control
for year and industry differences. The use of subjective performance evaluation varies
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across industries, which differ in innovation, technology, product life/development cycles,
and growth options (Bushman et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 2004; Hayes & Schaefer, 2000;
Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006). My matching criteria rely on the assumption that
subjective performance evaluation not related to shocks can be explained by firm size and
industry. This assumption may be too ambitious, a concern I address in Section 5.4.
My subsample consists of 353 treatment and 353 control firms between 1993 and 2012.
For each treatment and control firm, proxy statements are examined for information about
subjective performance evaluation in t− 1 (the year of the shock) and t.
5.2 Measuring Subjective Performance Evaluation
Firms can use subjectivity for setting CEO cash pay in three ways (Bushman et al., 1996;
Gibbs et al., 2004; Ittner et al., 2003). First, they can exclusively rely on subjective
judgement to determine CEO bonus. Second, they can ex post adjust financial and non-
financial performance measures or ex post change the intensity with which they use them.
Third, they can ex post adjust bonus awards based on performance measures other than
those specified ex ante in the bonus contract.
Based on these criteria, I identify a firm as using subjective performance evaluation if it
mentions ‘subjective’ and/or ‘discretion’ (or any variation thereof). I also consider individual
performance measures to be subjective, following Bushman et al. (1996). Appendix A
provides examples of subjective performance evaluation that involve discretion and individual
performance measures. Finally, if a firm describes performance measures not explicitly
specified ex ante in its proxy statement, those measures are considered to reflect subjectivity.
To measure the intensity with which firms use subjective performance evaluation, I
use two criteria. First, firms mentioning subjective performance evaluation in their proxy
statements are assumed to use subjective performance evaluation more intensely than firms
not mentioning subjective performance evaluation. Second, firms that mention using a higher
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number of performance measures for their subjective performance evaluation are considered
to use subjective performance evaluation more intensely.
Hypothesis 2 implies that treatment firms increase their use of subjective performance
evaluation from t − 1 to t significantly more than control firms. To test this hypothesis, I
analyze univariate statistics regarding changes between t−1 and t in subjective performance
evaluation, before carrying out multivariate tests.
5.3 Univariate Analysis
I explore whether the use of subjective performance evaluation changes from t− 1 to t, and
whether the number of performance measures used subjectively changes as well.
Table 6 displays, in Panel A, the number and percentage of firms using subjective
performance evaluation in t − 1 (the year of the shock) and t. The majority of firms,
be they treatment or control firms, use subjective performance evaluation in t − 1. After
a shock, subjective performance evaluation is used more intensely by treatment firms: 247
(70.0%) treatment firms utilize it in t, up from 234 (66.3%) in t − 1, an increase of 5.6%
(= 247−234
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). In contrast, 211 (59.8%) control firms rely on subjective performance evaluation
in t, down from 229 (64.9%) in t−1. Column (5) indicates that the difference in how intensely
treatment and control firms use subjective performance evaluation is significant at the 1%
level in t (χ2 = 8.06), but not in t − 1 (χ2 = 0.16). The evidence in Panel A suggests that
firms are more likely to use subjective performance evaluation after a shock.
–INSERT TABLE 6 HERE–
Panel B of Table 6 shows the average number of performance measures that treatment
and control firms use when evaluating their CEOs subjectively in t − 1 and t. After a
shock, firms increase the number of performance measures used for subjective performance
evaluation. Treatment firms depend on 2.16 subjective performance measures in t, up from
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1.85 in t− 1. In contrast, controls use 1.52 subjective performance measures in t, down from
1.80 in t− 1. The last row of column (3) reveals that treatment firms are significantly more
likely than controls to significantly increase, between t − 1 and t, the average number of
performance measures used subjectively. The evidence in Panel B suggests that firms use a
larger number of subjective performance measures after a shock.
The univariate analysis in Panels A and B of Table 6 controls for factors other than shocks
that can shape subjective performance evaluation, by mobilizing a matched pair procedure
that joins treatment to control firms based on firm size and industry. I explore the success
of this matching procedure by comparing, across treatment and control firms, variables
associated with subjective performance evaluation: growth options, risk, size, CEO tenure,
and losses (Bushman et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 2004; Hayes & Schaefer, 2000; Indjejikian
& Nanda, 2002; Raith, 2008; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). Panel C of Table 6 displays, for
treatment and control firms, the means of these variables in year t after the shock. The
evidence shows that treatment firms grow faster than controls, are riskier and smaller, and
incur more losses. The differences between treatment and control firms are statistically
significant for all variables except CEO tenure. This evidence suggests that the matching
procedure does not successfully pair treatment firms with controls on all variables that have
been shown in the literature to be associated with subjective performance evaluation. This
raises the concern that the univariate results in Panels A and B are driven by the significant
differences between treatment and control firms. To address this concern, I proceed to a
multivariate analysis that accounts for the above variables.
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5.4 Multivariate Analysis
My multivariate analysis explores a firm’s increase, between t−1 and t, in the intensity with
which it uses subjective performance evaluation, based on the following regression:
IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t = δ0 + δ1Treatmenti + δ2BooktoMarketi,t + δ3V olatilityi,t (2)
+δ4Salesi,t + δ5Lossi,t + δ6CEOTenurei,t + εi,t,t−1,
where IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t is either an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm
raises, between t − 1 and t, the use of subjective performance evaluation, and 0 otherwise
(IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t = IncreaseUsei,t−1,t); or an indicator variable that equals 1 if
a firm raises, between t − 1 and t, the number of performance measures used subjectively,
and 0 otherwise (IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t = IncreaseNumi,t−1,t). A firm raises the use of
subjective performance evaluation if it does not mention it in its proxy statement in t − 1,
but does mention it in its proxy statement in t. The variable Treatmenti is an indicator
variable that is 1 if a firm is a treatment firm, and 0 if it is a control. Regression (2) accounts
for factors other than shocks that can shape subjective performance evaluation by including
growth options, risk, size, the presence of losses, and CEO tenure. All variables are defined
in Appendix B. If treatment firms increase, between t − 1 and t, the intensity with which
they use subjective performance evaluation to a larger extent than controls, the coefficient
δ1 is significantly positive.
Equation (2) is estimated with a probit model; standard errors are robust and clustered
by firm. Table 7 shows the results for the use of subjective performance evaluation (i.e.,
Increasei,t−1,t = IncreaseUsei,t−1,t). The evidence in column (3) indicates that treatment
firms are more likely than controls to increase the use of subjective performance evaluation:
the coefficient on Treatmenti is significantly positive at 0.341 (Z-statistic: 2.04). This result
is robust to controlling for other determinants of subjective performance evaluation, which do
not have a sizable impact. In column (3), only growth options yield a significant coefficient
at 0.426 (Z-statistic=1.72), suggesting that firms with fewer growth options are more likely
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to boost subjective performance evaluation.
–INSERT TABLE 7 HERE–
Table 8 displays the findings for the number of performance measures used subjectively.
Column (1) shows that treatment firms are more likely than control firms to increase
the number of performance measures used subjectively. The coefficient on Treatmenti is
significantly positive at 0.460 (Z-statistic: 3.57). This result is driven by non-financial
performance measures: column (2) shows that treatment firms are more likely than controls
to increase the number of non-financial performance measures used subjectively, since the
coefficient on Treatmenti is significantly positive at 0.538 (Z-statistic: 3.61). Financial
performance measures are also used more intensely by treatment than control firms, as
shown in column (3). The only performance measures not differing between treatment and
control firms are individual ones, in column (4). Of the determinants other than shocks,
only growth options yield a positive coefficient, in columns (1) and (4).
–INSERT TABLE 8 HERE–
Collectively, the multivariate findings indicate that treatment firms are more likely than
controls to increase the use of subjective performance evaluation between t − 1 and t and
to draw on a higher number of performance measures for this performance evaluation.
This result is robust to controlling for factors shown in the literature to shape subjective
performance evaluation, thus confirming my univariate results.
6 Conclusion
This study examines the repercussions of economic shocks for objective and subjective
CEO performance evaluation. I explore objective CEO performance evaluation using the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings. I document that this sensitivity rises progressively
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after a shock occurs. I interpret my result as suggesting that pay-setting parties learn
over time about post-shock earnings. A shock perturbs the information that pay-setting
parties have about the roles of CEO ability and noise in determining earnings. To set the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings, they need these two parameters and therefore
estimate them. The estimation process gives rise to estimation risk, that is, additional
variation in estimated post-shock CEO ability and noise compared to their full-information
counterparts. To mitigate the impact of estimation risk on a risk-averse CEO, pay-setting
parties lower the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings after a shock. As time passes and
pay-setting parties learn about post-shock CEO ability and noise, they can estimate them
more precisely, and raise the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to post-shock earnings. I control
for determinants the literature shows are associated with the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to
earnings (i.e., growth options, noise, CEO tenure, earnings persistence).
An alternative explanation for my results is that firms experiencing more shocks are
different from firms experiencing fewer shocks, because of their investment, financing, and
governance policies. I address this explanation in two ways. First, I explore exogenous
shocks, which I measure using macro-economic shocks (i.e., expansions and recessions) from
the NBER. I find that the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings rises over time after a
macro-economic shock occurs. Second, I develop a measure of how resilient firms are to
shocks and include this measure in my analysis as a determinant of the sensitivity of CEO
cash pay to earnings. My results hold.
My evidence suggests that firms rely less on objective CEO performance evaluation
right after a shock than a few years later, when firms better understand the post-shock
environment. This evidence raises the question of how firms set CEO cash pay right after
a shock. I address this question by exploring subjective CEO performance evaluation. I
document that firms increase the intensity with which they use subjective CEO performance
evaluation immediately after a shock. This analysis is conducted using a subsample of firms
for which information on subjective CEO performance evaluation is hand-collected from
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proxy statements. Univariate results indicate not only that more firms use subjective CEO
performance evaluation in the year after the shock, but also that they raise the number
of performance measures they use subjectively. These results hold after comparison with
control firms (matched by industry and size) that do not experience shocks. Because this
match may not successfully account for all determinants of subjective CEO performance
evaluation, I draw on multivariate tests that include these determinants. My results hold.
My study extends our understanding of how economic shocks shape CEO performance
evaluation. It suggests that CEO performance evaluation is not static in an environment
characterized by economic shocks. Instead, it fluctuates: firms rely less on objective CEO
performance evaluation after a shock, when little is known about post-shock performance
measures, only to progressively use it more intensely again as time passes since the shock
occurred. Moreover, my findings imply that firms substitute objective with subjective CEO
performance evaluation right after a shock.
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A Examples of Subjective CEO Performance Evaluation
This appendix provides two examples of subjective performance evaluation. The first example
illustrates subjective performance evaluation that involves discretion of the compensation
committee. The treatment firm Parametric Technology Corp. reports in its 2003 proxy
statement that:
‘The incentive plans for fiscal 2003 set forth two performance factors for each participating
officer (including the Chief Executive Officer): revenue and operating margin. Target
levels were established for each performance factor and a gross target bonus corresponding
to each of the target levels was set. Because neither the revenue nor operating margin
targets were met for fiscal 2003, funding for the incentive bonuses was at the Committee’s
discretion’. (Parametric Technology Corp, 2003)
The second example illustrates subjective performance evaluation based on individual
performance measures. The treatment firm Royal Appliance writes in its 1994 proxy statement
that ‘The Committee based the 1994 compensation of Mr. Balch [its CEO] on the policies
and procedures described above [in the section about the company’s bonus plan]’. However,
the company indicates that it also uses discretion: ‘In addition, the Committee took into
account its assessment of Mr. Balch’s individual performance and his ability to expand and
develop new markets and products’. (Royal Appliance MFG Co, 1994)
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B Variable Definitions
CEO compensation and return data are in 1992 constant U.S. dollars. Compensation data
are from EXECUCOMP, accounting data from COMPUSTAT, and return data from CRSP.
• BooktoMarketi,t−1: natural logarithm of book value in t − 1 divided by the market
value in t − 1; the book value is total assets; the market value is the price per share
at year end times the number of shares outstanding plus total assets minus common
equity.
• CEOCashPayi,t: natural logarithm of real CEO cash pay (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
in t, which is salary (EXECUCOMP: SALARY) plus bonus pay (EXECUCOMP:
BONUS).
• CEOChairi,t: indicator variable that is 1 if the CEO chairs the board of directors in t,
and 0 otherwise. The chair title is identified by searching the CEO title (EXECUCOMP:
TITLEANN) for ‘chmn’ and ‘chairman’.
• CEOTenurei,t: natural logarithm of the number of years between the time the CEO
of firm i is appointed and the sample year t.
• Controls: control variables for the pay–performance sensitivity to earnings: CEOTenurei,t,
BooktoMarketi,t−1, Riski,t−1 and Persistencei.
• Earningsi,t: income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations in t scaled
by total assets in t− 1.
• IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t: either an indicator variable that is 1 if a firm increases,
between t − 1 and t, the use of subjective performance evaluation, and 0 otherwise
(IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t = IncreaseUsei,t−1,t); or an indicator variable that is 1
if a firm increases, between t − 1 and t, the number of performance measures used
subjectively, and 0 otherwise (IncreaseSubjectivityi,t−1,t = IncreaseNumberi,t−1,t).
• InterlockedCEOi,t: indicator variable that is 1 if the CEO is interlocked in t, and 0
otherwise, as indicated by the variable INTRLOCK on EXECUCOMP. EXECUCOMP
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defines CEOs as interlocked if they sit on their firm’s compensation committee, or on
the board of a company managed by an executive who sits on their firm’s board.
• K: control variables for the level of CEO cash pay: Salesi,t−1, BooktoMarketi,t−1,
V olatilityi,t−1, ri,t − rm,t, CEOTenurei,t, CEOChairi,t, and InterlockedCEOi,t.
• Lossi,t: indicator variable that is 1 if Earningsi,t < 0, and 0 otherwise.
• NumberFSi,t−1: the number of years since firm i experienced the last firm-specific shock
until (and including) t. A firm-specific shock occurs when its annual market-adjusted
return belongs to the decline of the most positive market-adjusted returns or the decile
of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years.
• NumberMACROi,t : the number of years since firm i experienced the last macro-economic
shock until (and including) t. A macro-economic shock occurs in the first year of an
expansion or a recession period, identified using data from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER). In the vicinity of the sample period (i.e., 1992–2013), the
NBER defines three recession periods (i.e., July 1990 through March 1991, March 2001
through November 2001, and December 2007 through June 2009) and three expansion
periods (i.e., March 1991 through March 2001, November 2001 through December 2007,
June 2009 through date to be determined). For the three recession periods, the years
of macro-economic shocks are 1990, 2001 and 2007; for the three expansion periods,
the years of macro-economic shocks are 1991, 2001, and 2009.
• Persistencei: earnings persistence, estimated between 1983 and 2013 for each firm i,
from the following IMA(1,1) process (Baber et al., 1998): At−At−1 = UAt−ΨUAt−1,
where UAi,t is the earnings innovation. Persistence = 1 − Ψ captures the extent
to which earnings innovations are permanent versus transitory. Table 4 shows that
average (median) Persistence is 0.71 (0.68); for comparison, the average (median)
persistence in Baber et al. (1998) is 0.86 (0.85).
• ri,t−rm,t: annual market-adjusted returns for firm i in fiscal t, computed by cumulating
monthly market-adjusted returns. The market is the equally weighted index; returns
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are inclusive of dividends and adjusted for stock splits.
• ResilienceFSi,t−1: resilience to firm-specific shocks, calculated by estimating, for each firm
i and year t, a regression of Earningsi,t−j on ri,t−j−rm,t−j during the 5 years preceding
the sample year (i.e., j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) to obtain the slope coefficient on ri,t−j − rm,t−j.
The absolute value of this slope coefficient is multiplied by −1 to give ResilienceFSi,t .
• ResilienceMACROi,t−1 : resilience to macro-economic shocks, calculated by estimating, for
each firm i and year t, a regression of Earningsi,t−j on rm,t−j (where rm,t−j is the
equally weighted market index) during the 5 years preceding the sample year (i.e.,
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) to obtain the slope coefficient on rm,t−j. The absolute value of this
slope coefficient is multiplied by −1 to give ResilienceMACROi,t .
• Riski,t−1: ranked ratio of risk from noise in earnings to risk from noise in returns.
Risk from noise in earnings is the variance of earnings during the five years preceding
t, while risk from noise in returns is the variance of monthly market-adjusted returns
during the 60 months preceding t (Lambert & Larcker, 1987).
• Salesi,t−1: natural logarithm of sales at the end of t− 1.
• Sales′i,t−1: sales at the end of t− 1, in million U.S.$.
• Treatmenti: an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a treatment firm, and
0 if it is a control. A treatment firm is a sample firm that experiences a shock in
t− 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive
market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns,
across all sample firm-years), has information on CEO cash pay available in its proxy
statements, and can be matched to a control firm. A control firm is a sample firm that
experiences no shock in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the
decile of the least positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the least negative
market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), and has information on CEO
cash pay available in its proxy statements. Control firms are matched to treatment
firms based on firm size (i.e., the t − 2 market value of common equity) and on fiscal
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year and 2-digit SIC code.
• V olatilityi,t−1: standard deviation of monthly stock returns, computed over the 60
months prior to t.
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Table 1: Sample from 1992 to 2013
Firms Firm-years
EXECUCOMP Data on annual CEO compensation 3,268 36,920
CEO has less than one year of tenure (42) (5,884)
3,216 31,036
Multiple CEOs by firm and year (10) (241)
3,206 30,795
Multiple firms by CEO and year (6) (142)
3,200 30,653
No COMPUSTAT data on earnings before extraordinary items,
and discontinued operations (66) (886)
3,134 29,767
Less than 24 months of CRSP return data; fiscal year changes (397) (4,334)
2,737 25,433
Annualized return data unavailable by fiscal year (0) (50)
Final sample, 1992–2013 2,737 25,383
This table shows the sample selection details between 1992 and 2013. Numbers in parentheses
are observations that are dropped.
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Table 2: Number of firm-specific shocks

















This table displays the number (‘Number of Firms’) and percentage (‘Percentage of Firms’)
of firms that experience a different number of shocks (‘Number of Shocks’). A shock occurs
when a firm’s annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Number of years NumberFSi,t since the last firm-specific shock occurred and the
sensitivity of CEO cash pay to earnings
Independent variable Predicted sign (1) (2) (3)




i,t + 0.017** 0.016**
(2.38) (2.30)
Earningsi,tCEOTenurei,t +/– 0.112* 0.106
(1.68) (1.63)
Earningsi,tBooktoMarketi,t−1 +/– –0.173*** –0.171***
(–2.77) (–2.65)
Earningsi,tRiski,t−1 – –0.428*** –0.415***
(–3.17) (–2.94)
Earningsi,tPersistencei + 0.290*** 0.279***
(3.37) (3.72)
NumberFSi,t +/– –0.004*** –0.003**
(–3.27) (–2.25)
CEOTenurei,t + 0.080*** 0.095*** 0.076***
(7.06) (7.04) (6.09)
BooktoMarketi,t−1 +/– –0.408*** 0.472*** –0.438***
(–16.48) (–18.82) (–18.18)
Riski,t−1 +/– –0.074*** –0.027
(–2.99) (–1.15)
Persistencei +/– –0.276 –0.700***
(–1.05) (–4.54)
ri,t − rm,t + 0.138*** 0.152*** 0.145***
(16.22) (18.26) (16.64)
Salesi,t−1 + 0.041*** 0.007 0.007
(3.68) (0.47) (0.75)
V olatilityi,t−1 +/– 0.548*** 0.487*** 0.524***
(3.96) (3.01) (3.95)
CEOChairi,t + 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.117***
(7.82) (7.74) (7.58)
InterlockedCEOi,t + 0.125*** 0.066* 0.095**
(3.31) (1.80) (2.31)
Adjusted R2 9.37% 12.73% 14.80%
# of observations 15,350 15,923 13,683
This table reports the results from estimating OLS regressions between 1992 and 2013 in the pooled cross-section with fiscal
year and CEO fixed effects. The dependent variable is CEOCashPayi,t, the natural logarithm of CEO cash pay (salary plus
bonus pay) of the CEO of firm i in fiscal year t. Earningsi,t is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
scaled by lagged total assets. NumberFSi,t is the number of years since the last firm-specific shock occurred, until (and including)
t. A firm-specific shock occurs when a firm’s annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive market-
adjusted returns or to the decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all years between 1950 and 2012, for all
sample firms. All variables are described in Appendix B. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors
clustered by firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%,
10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Implications of macro-economic shocks and of resilience to shocks for the sensitivity
of CEO cash pay to earnings
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Earningsi,t +/– 0.181 0.184 0.132 0.122
(1.26) (1.28) (0.80) (0.74)
Earningsi,tNumber
MACRO






















Adjusted R2 20.44% 20.48% 14.80% 14.86%
# of observations 21,202 21,147 13,683 13,683
This table reports the results from estimating OLS regressions between 1992 and 2013 in the pooled cross-section with fiscal
year and CEO fixed effects. The analysis includes all control variables used in Table 4 for the sensitivity of CEO cash pay to
earnings and for the level of CEO cash pay, but does not display these variables. The dependent variable is CEOCashPayi,t,
the natural logarithm of CEO cash pay (salary plus bonus pay) of the CEO of firm i in fiscal year t. Earningsi,t is income
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by lagged total assets. NumberFSi,t [Number
MACRO
i,t ] is the
number of years since the last firm-specific [macro-economic] shock occurred up until (and including) t, in columns (1) and
(2) [(3) and (4)]. A firm-specific shock occurs when a firm’s annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most
positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all years between 1950
and 2012, for all sample firms. A macro-economic shock occurs in the first year of an expansion or a recession period, identified
using data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). In the vicinity of the sample period (i.e., 1992–2013), the
NBER defines three recession periods (i.e., July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, and December 2007–June 2009)
and three expansion periods (i.e., March 1991–March 2001, November 2001–December 2007, and from June 2009 onwards).
For the three recession [expansion] periods, the years of macro-economic shocks are 1990, 2001, and 2007 [1991, 2001, and
2009]. ResilienceFSi,t−1 [Resilience
MACRO
i,t−1 ] captures resilience to firm-specific [macro-economic] shocks. All variables are
described in Appendix B. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by firm and are robust
to heteroscedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Univariate statistics for treatment and control firms
A. Use of subjective performance evaluation (SPE)
Treatment firms Control firms χ2
# % # %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t− 1 use SPE 234 66.3 229 64.9 0.16
do not use SPE 119 33.7 124 35.1
Total 353 100.0 353 100.0
t use SPE 247 70.0 211 59.8 8.06***
do not use SPE 106 30.0 142 40.2
Total 353 100.0 353 100.0
B. Number of performance measures used subjectively
Treatment firms Control firms Difference
(1) (2) (3)
t− 1 1.85 1.80 0.05
t 2.16 1.52 0.64***
Difference 0.31 –0.28 0.59***
C. Firm and CEO characteristics, in year t after the shock
Treatments Controls Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Growth options, BooktoMarketi,t−1 0.72 0.80 –0.08***
Risk, V olatilityi,t 0.20 0.15 0.05***
Size, Sales′i,t, in million U.S.$ 2,098.2 2,643.8 –460**
Losses, Lossi,t 0.353 0.188 0.16***
CEO tenure, CEOTenurei,t, in years 8.9 6.8 0.38
This table shows univariate statistics for the 353 treatment and 353 control firms between 1993 and 2012. Panel A compares the
number and percentage (%) of treatment firms that use or do not use subjective performance evaluation with the number and
percentage of control firms that use or do not use subjective performance evaluation. Panel B compares the average number of
performance measures that treatment firms use in subjective performance evaluation in t−1 and t with those that control firms
use. The column ‘Difference’ shows the average difference in the number of performance measures between treatment and control
firms. The row ‘Difference’ shows the average difference in the number of performance measures between t − 1 and t. Panel
C displays firm and CEO characteristics for treatment and control firms in the year after the shock. The column ‘Difference’
shows the average difference between treatment and control firms. A treatment firm is a sample firm that experiences a shock
in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive market-adjusted returns or to the
decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), has information on CEO cash pay available
in its proxy statements, and can be matched to a control firm. A control firm is a sample firm that experiences no shock in t−1
(i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the least positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of
the least negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), and has information on CEO cash pay available in its
proxy statements. Control firms are matched to treatment firms based on t−2 market values of common equity and 2-digit SIC
codes. In Panel A, the χ2-test compares the frequencies of controls that report using subjective performance evaluation and
those that do not report using it, with the frequencies of treatment firms that report using subjective performance evaluation
and those that do not report using it, in t − 1 and in t. In Panels B and C, the significance level for the ‘Difference’ is for
a Student’s t–test of the null that the difference in the number of performance measures is not different from zero, evaluated
using matched pairs. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 7: Increase in the use of subjective CEO performance evaluation
Independent variable Predicted sign (1) (2) (3)
Intercept +/– –1.69*** –2.02*** –2.08***
(–12.32) (–3.60) (–3.66)
Treatmenti + 0.320* 0.341**
(1.91) (2.04)
BooktoMarketi,t +/– 0.394 0.426*
(1.55) (1.72)
V olatilityi,t – 0.700 0.102
(0.68) (0.10)
Salesi,t + 0.046 0.039
(0.78) (0.69)
Lossi,t + 0.152 0.092
(0.83) (0.50)
CEOTenurei,t + –0.128 –0.124
(–1.07) (–1.06)
QIC 340.4 342.1 339.5
# of observations 706 670 670
This table reports the results from estimating probit regressions for 353 treatment and 353 control firms between 1992 and 2013
in the pooled cross-section. The dependent variable is IncreaseUsei,t−1,t, an indicator variable that equals 1 if, between t− 1
and t, a firm increases the use of subjective performance evaluation, and 0 otherwise. Treatmenti is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if a firm is a treatment firm, and 0 if a firm is a control. A treatment firm is a sample firm that experiences a shock
in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most positive market-adjusted returns or to the
decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), has information on CEO cash pay available
in its proxy statements, and can be matched to a control firm. A control firm is a sample firm that experiences no shock in
t− 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the least positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile
of the least negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), and has information on CEO cash pay available in
its proxy statements. Control firms are matched to treatment firms based on t− 2 market values of common equity and 2-digit
SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix B. QIC captures goodness of fit and can be used to compare models; the
model with the smaller QIC is preferable. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed with robust standard errors clustered by
firm. ***, **, * indicate significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Increase in the number of performance measures used in subjective CEO
performance evaluation
Performance measures
Independent Predicted All Non-financial Financial Individual
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept +/– –1.062** –1.700*** –2.131** –1.662***
(–2.42) (–3.25) (–3.57) (–2.42)
Treatmenti + 0.460*** 0.538*** 0.325* –0.123
(3.57) (3.61) (1.78) (–0.73)
BooktoMarketi,t +/– 0.354* 0.180 0.250 0.503*
(1.82) (0.83) (1.17) (1.91)
V olatilityi,t – –0.590 –0.530 0.634 –0.282
(–0.61) (–0.51) (0.68) (–0.30)
Salesi,t + –0.024 0.029 0.030 0.039
(–0.52) (0.50) (0.51) (0.58)
Lossi,t + –0.153 –0.162 0.151 –0.021
(–1.00) (–0.97) (0.75) (–0.08)
CEOTenurei,t + –0.047 0.033 0.022 –0.182
(–0.55) (0.34) (0.22) (–1.50)
QIC 630.9 512.5 403.9 362.6
# of observations 670 670 670 670
This table reports the results from estimating probit regressions for 353 treatment and 353 control firms between 1992 and
2013 in the pooled cross-section. The dependent variable is IncreaseNumi,t−1,t, an indicator variable that equals 1 if, between
t− 1 and t, a firm increases the number of performance measures used in subjective performance evaluation, and 0 otherwise.
Treatmenti is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a treatment firm, and 0 if a firm is a control. A treatment firm
is a sample firm that experiences a shock in t − 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the most
positive market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the most negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years),
has information on CEO cash pay available in its proxy statements, and can be matched to a control firm. A control firm is a
sample firm that experiences no shock in t− 1 (i.e., its annual market-adjusted return belongs to the decile of the least positive
market-adjusted returns or to the decile of the least negative market-adjusted returns, across all sample firm-years), and has
information on CEO cash pay available in its proxy statements. Control firms are matched to treatment firms based on t − 2
market values of common equity and 2-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix B. QIC captures goodness of fit
and can be used to compare models; the model with the smaller QIC is preferable. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed
with robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate significance levels for two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%
level, respectively.
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